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1 Introduction
My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian scepticism, as this stance
is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works, has practical or epistemic value.
More precisely, I would like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judg-
ment (epochē) and undisturbedness (ataraxia) can be deemed to be of practical or
epistemic value. By “practical” value I mean both moral value and prudential
value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value to per-
sonal or social well-being. Hence, when I ask whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension
and undisturbedness have practical value, I mean whether they make us behave
in a manner that is morally right or wrong, and whether they allow us to attain
those goals that would make it possible to live well. As for “epistemic” value, it ba-
sically refers to the values of attaining truth and avoiding error. Hence, when I ask
whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension has epistemic value, I mean whether it allows
us to attain truth and avoid error. My main focus will be the practical value of
both suspension and undisturbedness, because this is the value that scholars of an-
cient philosophy critical of Pyrrhonism have emphasised. The reason for examining
the epistemic value of suspension is that doing so will enable a fuller assessment of
the significance of Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy, which is my primary concern.
I will begin by briefly describing the states of suspension and undisturbedness
and their connection, and by succinctly considering some objections to the effect
that, despite claiming to suspend judgment across the board, Pyrrhonists actually
hold a number of beliefs. This will provide the necessary framework for the subse-
quent discussions. I will then critically engage with interpreters who have called
into question the practical value of undisturbedness and suspension. Next, I will ex-
amine what the epistemic value of suspension might be. I will end by considering
whether, from a contemporary vantage point, one must conclude that Pyrrhonism
has no practical or epistemic value, and hence that it is of no philosophical interest.¹
This paper is a substantially revised and expanded version of an article originally published in Dutch
as “De praktische en epistemische waarde van het pyrronisme,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift
voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2016): 73‒98. For their comments, I would like to reiterate my thanks to
the anonymous reviewer for that journal and to Jan Willem Wieland, and to express my gratitude
to the anonymous reviewer for the present volume.
 Sextus employs “sceptic” and “Pyrrhonist” (and their respective cognates) interchangeably. I will
do the same. I will also follow him in using the term “dogmatist” to refer to anyone who makes as-
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2 Suspension and Undisturbedness
When someone with even a slight familiarity with ancient Pyrrhonism thinks of it,
two notions invariably come to mind, namely, epochē and ataraxia. This is perfectly
reasonable. Consider, for instance, the definition of scepticism that Sextus offers at
the beginning of his best-known work, the Pyrrhonian Outlines:
The sceptical [way] is an ability to set up oppositions among things that appear and things that
are thought in any way whatsoever, an ability from which we come, through the equipollence in
the opposed objects and arguments, first to suspension of judgment and after that to undisturb-
edness (PH 1.8).²
At PH 1.10, Sextus defines equipollence or equal force (isostheneia) as “equality in
respect of credibility and lack of credibility, so that none of the conflicting arguments
takes precedence over any other as more credible” (cf. PH 1.190, 196, 202); suspen-
sion as “a standstill of the intellect owing to which we neither deny nor affirm any-
thing” (cf. PH 1.192, 196); and undisturbedness as “lack of perturbation and calmness
of soul.” Undisturbedness is not only the mental state at which the Pyrrhonist has
arrived after suspending judgment, but the goal that prompted the Pyrrhonist-to-
be to engage in philosophical inquiry in the first place. Indeed, Sextus tells us
that the hope of becoming undisturbed is the “causal principle” (i.e., the initial mo-
tivation) of the sceptical philosophy (PH 1.12), and that so far the Pyrrhonist’s aim is
both undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection (metriopa-
theia) in those things that are unavoidable (PH 1.25, 30; cf. PH 1.18, 215; 3.235). Ac-
cording to Sextus’s description of the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical itinerary (PH 1.12,
26, 29; cf. AM 1.6), the Pyrrhonist-to-be was disturbed by the variation (anōmalia)
he found in both perceptual and intellectual appearances and was in a state of apo-
ria as to which of them he should assent to. For instance, the same object appeared
to him to have conflicting perceptual properties depending on different spatial and
quantitative variables, or the same moral view appeared to him to be both convincing
and unconvincing depending on the vantage point from which it was considered. To
remove that state of disturbance, the Pyrrhonist undertook philosophical investiga-
tion in order to determine which appearances are true and which are false. However,
he was unable to do this owing to the seeming equipollence of the conflicting ap-
pearances, and so he suspended judgment. To his surprise, by suspending judgment
he attained the state of undisturbedness that he was seeking all along—there being
thus a contrast between the way undisturbedness was initially expected to be at-
sertions about how things really are on the basis of what they regard as objective evidence and sound
arguments.
 References to Sextus’s works are supplied in parenthesis in the body of the text, using the follow-
ing abbreviations: PH (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes), AM (Adversus Mathematicos), and AD (Adversus Dog-
maticos = AM 7‒11). All translations are my own.
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tained and the way it was in fact finally attained. Sextus emphasises that undisturb-
edness has closely followed suspension of judgment by chance (PH 1.26, 29) and as a
shadow follows a body (PH 1.29).
Sextus does not limit himself to reporting that undisturbedness has in fact fol-
lowed suspension. In the first and third books of PH, and above all in Against the
Ethicists (AD 5 = AM 11), he also explains why holding beliefs about how things really
are prevents one from becoming undisturbed, offering at the same time an account of
how suspension leads to undisturbedness, and also to happiness. His explanation
focuses exclusively on evaluative beliefs: the presence of the things one believes
to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces perturbation. For when a
person lacks what he regards as good, on the one hand he intensely desires to obtain
it and, on the other, he thinks he is persecuted by things naturally bad and restlessly
tries to escape them. If he acquires what he considers to be good, he is nonetheless
troubled both because he is irrationally and immoderately elated and because he is
afraid of losing it (PH 1.27, 3.237, 277; AD 5.116‒17, 146). For this reason, even when he
is not directly disturbed by the presence of those things he deems to be bad, he con-
tinues to be troubled by his constantly guarding against them (AD 5.117, 129). In ad-
dition, those who believe that things are by nature good or bad are unhappy or can
never attain happiness (AD 5.111, 113, 118, 130, 144) inasmuch as “all unhappiness oc-
curs because of some disturbance” (AD 5.112; cf. 141). Unlike the belief that things are
by nature good or bad, suspension of judgment on the matter makes it possible to
attain undisturbedness and happiness, and hence to lead a satisfactory life (PH
1.28; AD 5.111, 144, 160, 168; see also PH 3.235; AD 5.147, 150), for those who suspend
judgment “neither avoid nor pursue anything intensely” (PH 1.28). It should be noted
that Sextus remarks that undisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgment
about all things (PH 1.31, 205; AD 5.144; cf. AD 5.160, 168), which means that the at-
tainment of undisturbedness has so far occurred only when the sceptic has suspend-
ed judgment about all the matters he has investigated—both those that concern val-
ues and those that do not. The sceptic cannot of course rule out the possibility that
others will attain undisturbedness by suspending judgment only about some beliefs,
but given his past experience, it appears to him that undisturbedness will be attained
only when complete suspension is adopted.³
Despite what Sextus says in some of the passages just referred to, the Pyrrhonist
is not free from all disturbance and hence cannot attain complete happiness, since
not all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit of the things considered as good and
the intense avoidance of the things considered as bad. For the Pyrrhonist is disturbed
by certain things that impose themselves upon him, such as thirst and hunger (PH
 I have elsewhere argued that, in Sextus’s account of Pyrrhonism, one can identify three distinct
causes of disturbance concerning matters of opinion and that the holding of evaluative beliefs is
the ultimate source of doxastic disturbance by reference to which the other two can be explained.
See Diego Machuca, “Sources of Doxastic Disturbance in Sextus Empiricus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 56 (2019).
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1.29; AD 5.143, 148‒50, 156‒58; cf. PH 1.13, 24). Yet he is better off with regard to these
unpleasant affections (pathē) than the dogmatist, since he does not experience the
additional disturbance induced by the belief that such affections are by nature
bad; it is precisely the absence of that belief that renders them moderate and
more easily borne (PH 1.30, 3.235‒36; AD 5.118, 150‒55, 161; see also AD 5.128‒29,
145, 156‒60). The existence of those involuntary affections is the reason why Sextus
says that moderation of affection in things unavoidable is, along with undisturbed-
ness in matters of opinion, the sceptical aim.
It might be objected that, despite claiming to suspend judgment across the
board, Sextus holds a number of beliefs about the nature of certain mental states
as well as about the means for, and the hindrance to, the attainment of suspension
and undisturbedness. First, undisturbedness is presented as the core component of
human happiness and is hence deemed to be good or worthy of pursuit. Second, the
state of disturbance, caused by the holding of beliefs, is considered as something
bad or to be avoided. Third, there exists a causal link between undisturbedness
and suspension, which makes the latter a desirable state. Fourth, the Pyrrhonist be-
lieves that the opposing arguments he uses are, because of their objective equipol-
lence, an effective means to induce suspension.
For reasons of space, I will limit myself to making a few remarks in response to
that general objection. First, the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment or makes no determi-
nations about the intrinsic value of anything (PH 1.28, 163; 3.178, 182, 235), and hence
he does not believe that undisturbedness is objectively good or worthy of pursuit,
and that disturbance is objectively bad or to be avoided. Rather, these two states ap-
pear to him to be, respectively, good and bad for himself and others, and hence when
talking about them he is merely reporting on how things have so far appeared to him.
At one point, Sextus explicitly observes that, whenever the Pyrrhonist says that some
things are good and others bad, he is simply reporting on how they appear to him
(AD 5.19‒20).
Secondly, by saying that undisturbedness followed suspension by chance, Sex-
tus intends to express his characteristic caution, which prevents him from asserting
that things are by nature such that undisturbedness can only be reached by suspend-
ing judgment. Of course, he does not deny a necessary connection between them ei-
ther. He is simply restricting himself to describing what has hitherto occurred to him
and others, without making any assertions about the causal connection between
those states. By likening the connection between suspension and undisturbedness
to that of a body and its shadow, he is not being inconsistent. For one must not
put the emphasis on the fact that a shadow always and necessarily follows a body
when the body blocks light, but on the fact that in this situation there is a close con-
nection between them. Sextus’s intention is only to emphasise that up until now the
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sceptic’s suspension has been closely accompanied by the state of undisturbedness.⁴
Although the sceptic does not assert that suspension causes undisturbedness, given
his past experience he has the expectation that undisturbedness will continue to fol-
low upon his suspension of judgment about everything. And if undisturbedness re-
mains an aim he hopes to achieve, this will be a motivation for suspending judg-
ment. The same considerations apply to the connection between the holding of
beliefs and the state of disturbance: the sceptic only reports on his own experience.
Thirdly, Sextus does not believe that the arguments he has so far examined are
objectively equipollent or equally credible, but only reports that they appear so to
him (PH 1.196, 203). He employs certain types of arguments not because he can as-
sure us that there is a necessary connection between them and suspension, but sim-
ply because those arguments have thus far been successful in inducing this state in
himself and others. But this would be only a part of his response, given that, at PH
3.280‒81, he tells us that the Pyrrhonist employs any therapeutic argument that
makes it possible to induce suspension in his dogmatic patients.⁵ This shows that
the Pyrrhonist does not restrict himself to utilising the arguments that have induced
suspension in himself and his past patients, but may also use other arguments that
have not proven similarly successful. Or—to put it another way—it shows that the ar-
guments that have induced suspension in the Pyrrhonist and his past patients may
not achieve the same results with future patients.
A final and related point concerns the following question: when the Pyrrhonist
suspends judgment in the face of disagreements between equipollent positions, is
the connection between equipollence and suspension to be interpreted as a require-
ment of rationality or as a merely psychological constraint? Some scholars have de-
fended a rationalist interpretation according to which by suspending judgment the
Pyrrhonist is abiding by the following principle or norm of rationality: one is ration-
ally required to suspend judgment about p in the face of a disagreement between
views on p that strike one as equipollent. Others have defended the psychological
interpretation according to which suspension is the involuntary psychological effect
of being confronted with rival views that appear to one to be equipollent. Given that
the Pyrrhonist is a thinking being (PH 1.24) who is hardwired to respond in specific
ways, he is affected by the consideration of arguments pro and con p and automati-
cally reacts in a given way, even though he refrains from making assertions about
both whether those arguments are sound and whether they are objectively equipol-
lent. I will not enter here into the debate between the two interpretations, limiting
 See Diego Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006):
116.
 On the Pyrrhonist’s argumentative therapy, see Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and
φιλανθρωπία,” 129‒34; Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” Méthexis
22 (2009): 102, 112; Machuca, “Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry,” Apeiron
52 (2019): 199‒221.
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myself to saying that I side with the psychological interpretation.⁶ As we will see in
Section 4, the assessment of the epistemic value of suspension seems to partially de-
pend on which interpretation is correct.
3 The Practical Value of Suspension and
Undisturbedness
Whereas Sextus’s explanation of how holding value beliefs produces disturbance
may to a certain extent sound plausible from a contemporary vantage point, the ref-
erences to undisturbedness and happiness sound alien to those who are today in the
business of philosophy. The reason is that, in general, philosophy does not have
much to do with our well-being anymore. Moreover, the claim that undisturbedness
follows upon suspension may sound strange because we do not believe that we
could ever get rid of much of what disturbs us in our lives by suspending judgment
across the board. These and similar reasons no doubt explain why systematic discus-
sions of Pyrrhonian scepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy have entirely ig-
nored what Sextus says about undisturbedness, focusing for the most part on the
epistemological implications of the so-called “Five Modes of Agrippa” and, to a less-
er degree, on whether it is possible to eschew all beliefs and to act accordingly. It is
nonetheless worthwhile to examine what practical value there may be in Pyrrhonian
suspension and undisturbedness, because some scholars of ancient philosophy have
called into question both their prudential and their moral value. I will review their
criticisms and attempt to address them—at least in part.
One of the strongest and most common charges levelled in antiquity against both
Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism is the inactivity (apraxia) objection, of which
there were various versions. According to that objection, the denial of all knowledge
and the suspension of all judgment should be rejected because they make it impos-
sible either to perform any action at all, or to act in certain ways (morally, sensibly, or
rationally).⁷ Similar pragmatic responses to scepticism are found among interpreters
of Pyrrhonism, some of whom have contested the prudential value of both suspen-
sion of judgment and undisturbedness.⁸ For instance, it has been argued that most
 See Diego Machuca, “Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction,” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient,
Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), sec. 5; Machu-
ca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” Elenchos 34 (2013): sec. 4.
 I examine the various versions of the objection and the replies offered by Arcesilaus and Sextus in
Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme an-
tique, eds. Diego Machuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2019), 53‒87.
 The attempt to refute scepticism (of one kind or another) by focusing on its practical consequences
is still today a common manoeuvre among both philosophers and ordinary people, who usually dis-
card scepticism because its implications are disastrous, depressing, or immoral. Even in current dis-
cussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, suspension of judgment is sometimes rejected
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theoretical puzzles, difficulties, or disagreements do not bring about anxiety but are
rather exciting and enthralling⁹; that it is unreasonable or ridiculous to think that
suspension can eliminate or mitigate the disturbance a person experiences or that
suspension is a reliable recipe for tranquillity¹⁰; that belief in objective values produ-
ces a sense of security, not anxiety¹¹; and that it is highly doubtful that the attain-
ment of undisturbedness is either desirable or psychologically possible.¹² If any of
this were true, then the prudential value of suspension and undisturbedness
would be undermined. For in those cases in which unresolved disagreements do
not cause anxiety, there is nothing to be removed through suspension, while in
those cases in which there is indeed anxiety concerning matters of belief, suspension
is useless either because it is not efficacious in removing that anxiety or because it is
simply impossible to achieve that goal given human beings’ psychological makeup.
And even if it were psychologically possible to attain the state of undisturbedness by
suspending judgment, living an undisturbed life is not appealing or desirable be-
cause it would deprive us of all excitement.
In response, let me first note that the above criticisms overlook the fact that it
seems to be one’s own psychological makeup and one’s personal history that deter-
mine to a considerable extent what causes anxiety in an individual, whether one re-
gards an undisturbed life as liberating or depressing, and whether one is able to at-
tain undisturbedness by suspending judgment or in any other way.¹³ For instance,
some logicians and mathematicians seem to be distressed by their failure to find sol-
utions to certain logical and mathematical paradoxes while others do not, even
because of its allegedly damaging practical effects. See Diego Machuca, “Conciliationism and the
Menace of Scepticism,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 54, no. 3 (September 2015): sec. 3.
This shows—pace Suzanne Obdrzalek, “From Skepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cic-
ero’s Academica,” Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012): 388‒90—that to reply to scepticism by pointing to its
practical consequences is not foreign to contemporary epistemological discussions.
 See Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 63, 75‒76; Jonathan Barnes, Introduction to Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scep-
ticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), xxx‒xxxi.
 See Mates, The Skeptic Way, 63, 76‒77; Barnes, Introduction, xxxi; Richard Bett, “Le scepticisme
ancien est-il viable aujourd’hui?” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique, eds. Diego
Machuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2019), 172.
 See Julia Annas, “Doing without Objective Values: Ancient and Modern Strategies,” in Compan-
ions to Ancient Thought IV: Ethics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 208, 213.
 See Gisela Striker, “Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism,” in Pyr-
rhonian Skepticism, ed.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 22; Strik-
er, “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepti-
cism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 196.
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. Mark McPherran, “Ataraxia
and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism: Is the Skeptic Really Happy?” Proceedings of the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1989): 150.
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though all of them care about their research and believe that it has epistemic value,
and perhaps even prudential value. Similarly, some people want to live a life of con-
stant excitement, vertigo, and risk, and their heart would therefore sink at the pros-
pects of a life characterised by the Pyrrhonist’s undisturbedness; but others do prefer
an undisturbed life. Moreover, some might even regard an undisturbed life as excit-
ing. Finally, the person taking up the Pyrrhonian attitude may either enjoy a laid-
back and indifferent state of mind—being aware as he is of the unavoidable complex-
ity of things and having, as it were, seen it all before—or else experience profound
angst—due to the uncertainty caused by unresolved disagreements and the hesita-
tion about what he is supposed to do in the absence of an epistemic criterion that
would allow us to determine what is true and what is false. For instance, the realisa-
tion that one cannot establish whether there exist objective moral values might spare
a person the anguish suffered by those who believe that an action they have per-
formed is morally wrong, or else might lead that person to depression or distress.
Whether, being a Pyrrhonist, one finds oneself in one or the other of these states
seems to depend on one’s personality or temperament. Consider the indisputable,
albeit often overlooked, fact that people react in strikingly distinct ways both
while and after facing extremely harsh situations. For example, while some people
have been able to survive concentration camps or civil wars and then to rebuild
their lives in remote countries after losing literally everything and without seeking
revenge, many of us find their reactions extremely hard to understand and would
most probably have been incapable of behaving in the same way. Consider also
how some religious believers lead an anguished life despite their belief in the exis-
tence of a benevolent and provident god, while some agnostics lead a fulfilling life
despite their suspension of judgment on the matter. I therefore do not think that
there are sufficient grounds for regarding Sextus’s report that some people were
able to become undisturbed after suspending judgment as ridiculous or false, unless
one believes that one is entitled to generalise one’s own experience and dismiss a
person’s report of his experience when it is radically different. Suspension may or
may not continue to work for the Pyrrhonist in the future and it may or may not
work for other people; it is up to each individual to try it and see, so that there is
no room for prejudices about its possible success. I do not mean to suggest that
one must accept as true every testimony one hears, but only that one should be ex-
tremely cautious when discarding someone’s report on his own experience.¹⁴ We
should keep in mind that Sextus does not intend to provide a recipe for becoming
undisturbed or for attaining happiness, but only reports on what has so far occurred
to him and others, and offers what appears to him as a tentative explanation of that
experience. In sum, it does not seem possible to determine a priori whether suspen-
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. McPherran, “Ataraxia and
Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 150, 171.
50 Diego E. Machuca
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM
sion and undisturbedness have any prudential value, i.e., whether they either con-
tribute to or make possible the attainment of those goals we seek in order to live well.
Martha Nussbaum is the interpreter who has most vehemently criticised Pyrrhon-
ism on account of its practical consequences, focusing on the moral and political
value of suspension and undisturbedness. Her attack on Pyrrhonism in “Equilibrium:
Scepticism and Immersion in Political Deliberation” is conducted by contrasting it
with John Rawls’s moral and political philosophy.¹⁵ Although she does not distin-
guish between them, Nussbaum in fact follows two different lines of argument: (1)
one that calls attention to the supposedly harmful practical implications of Pyrrhon-
ism¹⁶; and (2) one that calls attention either (a) to the Pyrrhonist’s alleged inconsis-
tency in believing in the value of undisturbedness and in being confident in the effi-
cacy of his means to attain it,¹⁷ or (b) to his alleged failure to show the impossibility
of the kind of justification that Rawls provided for our moral and political choices.¹⁸
These two lines of argument can be labelled, respectively, “pragmatic” and “episte-
mic.” Note that, were the epistemic line of argument successful, there would be no
need for the pragmatic: if the Pyrrhonist were inconsistent or did not succeed in un-
dermining the epistemic justification of our moral and political beliefs and practices,
then there would be no reason for worrying about the pragmatic consequences of
adopting his sceptical outlook. The primary purpose of Nussbaum’s essay, though,
is to develop the pragmatic line of argument, most probably because she is shocked
by what she takes to be the deeply damaging effects of Pyrrhonism and because she
thinks there is a threatening revival of Pyrrhonism in certain postmodernist thinkers
and in the popular part of our public culture.¹⁹ I will refrain from addressing here the
epistemic line of argument mainly because I am particularly interested in Nuss-
baum’s pragmatic line of argument, but also because I have dealt with the kind of
inconsistency she ascribes to the Pyrrhonist in the previous section and elsewhere²⁰
and because I think she simply underestimates the sceptical challenge that disagree-
 Martha Nussbaum, “Equilibrium: Scepticism and Immersion in Political Deliberation,” in Ancient
Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Acta Philosophica Fennica 66), ed. Juha Sihvola (Helsinki: So-
cietas Philosophica Fennica, 2000), 171‒97.
 Nussbaum, 191‒94.
 Nussbaum, 189‒92.
 Nussbaum, 183‒87.
 In previous work, Nussbaum focused at greater length on the epistemic line of argument. See
Martha Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives: Disturbance and the Life without Belief,” in The Therapy
of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),
300‒306; Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law,” Harvard Law
Review 107 (1994): 733‒36. Although Nussbaum also developed the pragmatic line of argument
(see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒15; “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737‒39, 742), she nonetheless
saw some practical benefits in adopting the Pyrrhonian outlook (see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313; “Skep-
ticism about Practical Reason,” 738, 742). In “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” she discusses at
greater length the views of those she regards as the contemporary counterparts of ancient Pyrrhon-
ism.
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 115‒23, 132‒33.
Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 51
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM
ment poses to the task of epistemically justifying our moral and political beliefs and
practices.
Nussbaum claims that Pyrrhonism is both “morally and politically pernicious.”²¹
The Pyrrhonist’s denial of the possibility of reaching a consensus among rival posi-
tions and his loss of commitment to normative beliefs are the sort of views that made
the rise of Nazism possible and that could enable the recurrence of something sim-
ilar. The reason is that, for the Pyrrhonist, the choice of a political regime cannot be
based on reason, but only on the play of forces. She expresses a worry common
among anti-sceptics:
[A] person who sees himself and his political life as simply a space in which forces play them-
selves out cannot be relied on for the same committed behaviour we can demand from a person
who sees justice as possible and worthy of profound commitment and sacrifice. A person who
views every claim as having its equally powerful counterclaim and his inclination to one side as
mere antiquated habit is not likely to stick up for those habits in the way that someone will who
believes that they are justifiable by a rational procedure.²²
In addition, undisturbedness is not always desirable, for
the world in which we live is disturbing; disturbance is a rational response to it. And the person
who is with good reason disturbed, and who sees her disturbance as well grounded, will not be
satisfied, like the sceptic, by the removal of disturbance within her own person.²³
She even goes as far as to affirm that Pyrrhonism is
profoundly selfish, indeed solipsistic … seen as a program for philosophy in a needy and trou-
bled world containing urgent human problems. … If philosophy is only capable of making the
individual practitioner feel calm, then Socrates’s enemies would be right: philosophy is a dan-
gerous form of self-indulgence, subversive of democracy, and its teachers are corrupters of the
young. Fortunately, philosophy is capable of much more than that.²⁴
Nussbaum also thinks that Pyrrhonism deprives us of part of what makes us
human. For by suspending judgment, motivated by his desire for undisturbedness,
the Pyrrhonist loses his normative commitments, and when these go, “something
fundamental to humanity goes out with them, something that is integral to our abil-
ity to care for another and act on another’s behalf.”²⁵ She adds that
human beings are not only instinctual but also ethical creatures, who do care about getting
things right and do commit themselves to views of the good, modifying their animal behavior
accordingly. This means that the sceptic cannot straightforwardly claim to be allowing us to fol-
 Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 171.
 Nussbaum, 192‒93. Cf. Annas, “Doing without Objective Values,” 211‒12.
 Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 193.
 Nussbaum, 194.
 Nussbaum, 173.
52 Diego E. Machuca
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM
low our nature: he must admit that he is removing or curtailing something that is fundamental
in the natures of most human beings.²⁶
Thus, Nussbaum believes that the Pyrrhonist (i) is immoral, (ii) is unreliable, (iii)
does not care about others, and (iv) removes something essential to our human na-
ture. I will make six sets of remarks in reply to Nussbaum’s four criticisms.
The first thing to be noted is that Nussbaum commits a petitio principii inasmuch
as she takes for granted that about which the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment, name-
ly, the existence of something that is objectively right or wrong. Instead of establish-
ing the truth of the belief, called into question by the Pyrrhonist, that certain things
are morally good or bad, Nussbaum begs the question by assuming the truth of that
belief in her attack on Pyrrhonism. In her view, the world in which we live is disturb-
ing because there are morally bad things that occur that cause indignation and dis-
approval—such as the rise of certain political regimes responsible for mass murder—
and so looking for personal undisturbedness is objectively wrong. This is why the
Pyrrhonist is portrayed as selfish, solipsistic, politically subversive, and corruptive.
These claims, even if they were true, have force only for those who are already
moral realists; and I think it is acceptable to criticise the Pyrrhonist if one adopts
such a point of view. But it should be borne in mind that, in doing so, one has
not engaged the Pyrrhonist in philosophical debate, nor has one shown that he is
mistaken in suspending judgment in the moral domain. Insofar as she does not dis-
cuss the Pyrrhonist’s metaethical arguments, Nussbaum’s pragmatic line of argu-
ment is dialectically ineffective.
Secondly, it is a mistake to claim that the Pyrrhonist is necessarily selfish, solip-
sistic,²⁷ politically subversive, or corruptive, just as it is a mistake to claim that he is
necessarily philanthropic (despite what Sextus says at PH 3.280‒81), politically con-
 Nussbaum, 191. Richard Bett makes a similar point when claiming that the Pyrrhonist’s lack of
moral commitments and the passivity shown in his practical decisions reveal that he is not an ethi-
cally engaged agent. See “How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern,
and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 3‒17. For this reason,
he maintains, the sceptical life is not a life that people could reasonably welcome or to which
they could aspire. It is also worth noting that a related objection has recently been raised by some
interpreters on the basis of a version of the inactivity charge levelled by the Stoics against the Aca-
demic sceptics: even if the Pyrrhonist’s scepticism does not condemn him to remain utterly inactive,
his actions are not those of a rational agent, for he does not believe he can offer any epistemic rea-
sons for his desires and his decisions, and so Pyrrhonism deprives us of the rationality distinctive of
human beings. Proponents of this objection include Casey Perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay
on Pyrrhonian Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Katja Vogt, “Scepticism and Ac-
tion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 165‒80; and Jan Willem Wieland, “Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?” Philosoph-
ical Explorations 15, no. 3 (September 2012): 277‒89. I have critically dealt with this objection in “Pyr-
rhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” sec. 5, and in “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.
 Or individualistic, as Luciano Floridi has called him in Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and
Recovery of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32.
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servative or conformist (despite following the laws and customs of his community,
PH 1.23‒24),²⁸ or tolerant (despite the fact that he is unable to resolve disagreements
and hence cannot reject any view on epistemic grounds). For whether the Pyrrhonist
adopts one or the other of these attitudes depends on circumstantial factors, such as
his psychological makeup, his upbringing, his education, his life experiences, and
his socio-cultural context.²⁹ None of these attitudes is necessarily entailed by the
suspension of judgment or the adoption of what appears (to phainomenon) as the cri-
terion of action (PH 1.21‒24; AD 1.30 [= AM 7.30]). Insofar as he continues to suspend
judgment across the board, the Pyrrhonist has no epistemic reasons either to em-
brace or to reject a given attitude, and so he will, as Nussbaum points out, let the
play of forces drive him—a play of forces that nonetheless is not totally passive as
it includes the exercise of the natural capability of thinking (PH 1.24).³⁰ But this
means that nothing rules out the possibility that the Pyrrhonist may, for example,
have been raised in a familial and social context in which philanthropy is deemed
to be morally correct, and that the way things non-doxastically appear to him now
is shaped by such a conception. By the same token, nothing rules out the possibility
that he may be selfish and individualistic because of the upbringing he received or
because of his life experiences. The same goes for the Pyrrhonist’s alleged conserva-
tism or conformism, for he may have been raised so as to oppose authority and the
accepted ways of conducting oneself.³¹ Similarly, the fact that he cannot reject a
given position on the basis of its being incorrect or epistemically unjustified does
not entail that he must be tolerant. For his suspension does not of course require
that he respects all the views held in his community because such respect is the mo-
rally correct attitude. He may resist certain positions simply because they constitute a
practical hindrance to the way in which he lives or simply because they are emotion-
ally disruptive. Now, Nussbaum herself recognises my point when she talks about the
Pyrrhonist having an inclination towards a given attitude out of habit. She thinks
that this makes him unreliable (a claim I address next), but the point is that she
should accept that this does not make him necessarily selfish, solipsistic, politically
subversive, or corruptive. It is clear that, from the point of view of moral realists, the
Pyrrhonist’s suspension does not have moral value insofar as it does not entail the
 Bett writes about “the more general conformism of the skeptic,” which he regards as an “unat-
tractive feature” of the sceptic’s stance (“How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 11).
 See Diego Machuca, Review of Luciano Floridi Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery
of Pyrrhonism, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 338‒39; Machuca, “The
Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 134‒36.
 On the Pyrrhonist’s extensive but non-normative use of reason, see Diego Machuca, “Argumen-
tative Persuasiveness,” 116‒23; Machuca, “Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction,” secs. 4
and 5; Machuca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” sec. 4; Machuca, “Agrippan Pyrrhonism
and the Challenge of Disagreement,” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): sec. 3; Machuca,
“Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 5.
 Here I disagree with Bett, who claims that it is “unlikely that the skeptic will step far outside the
status quo if … that would be difficult or unpopular” (“How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 12).
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adoption of those attitudes they regard as morally correct. But, once again, this is
entirely different from claiming that he inevitably takes up attitudes that moral real-
ists regard as morally incorrect. Someone might object that the Pyrrhonist’s suspen-
sion lacks moral value all the same because, even though it does not preclude the
adoption of an attitude of philanthropy, tolerance, or respect for accepted modes
of conduct, such an adoption would not be based on the belief that these attitudes
are morally correct. This may be so from the point of view of moral realists, but such
an objection grants that the Pyrrhonist can conduct himself in a way that is not self-
ish, individualistic, politically subversive, or corruptive.
Thirdly, from a descriptive point of view, I am not sure that people with strong
commitments are in general reliable, nor that they are more reliable than those
who lack such commitments and let the play of forces drive them. This is so even
in those few cases in which people have reflected on their commitments and believe
that they are epistemically justified. Of all the religious believers and moral realists
you know, how many are reliable because of their religious and moral commitments?
It may be the case that someone is reliable precisely because he has strong commit-
ments to certain principles and rules. But it seems clear that certain patterns of be-
haviour may be stronger when they have been unreflectively acquired in childhood
than when they are the result of reflection, and in the former case they may be
much harder to dislodge even if one came to the conclusion that they have no ration-
al basis. It is no doubt possible that such patterns of behaviour are strengthened by a
process of reflection and justification, but the important point is that this does not
mean that they are not strong enough to confer reliability on the person in whom
they have been inculcated independently of such a process.
Fourthly, as regards the claim that, by suspending judgment about moral com-
mitments, the Pyrrhonist deprives us of part of our human nature, two remarks
are in order. The first is that, pace Nussbaum,³² the Pyrrhonist does not completely
deprive us of our emotions, for it does not appear to be the case that desiderative
attitudes such as “anger, fear, jealousy, grief, envy, passionate love … all rest …
upon belief”³³ and that “love, fear, grief” are based on “beliefs about worth.”³⁴ To
be more precise, I do not think that such emotions depend necessarily on belief.
For instance, do animals, which do seem to experience anger, fear, grief, and affec-
tion, hold beliefs? Also, granting that a two-year-old is capable of loving his mother,
does he hold the belief that his mother is worth love? And even if he does, does he
love his mother because he holds that belief? Someone could object that, even if one
granted that emotions can be experienced in the absence of beliefs, Sextus’s ascrip-
tion of the state of undisturbedness to the Pyrrhonist indicates that he seeks to re-
move all emotions. One could reply by noting that, as we saw in the previous section,
 Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒14; Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737.
 Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313.
 Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737.
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one part of the twofold goal of scepticism is the moderation of affection in things that
are unavoidable, and by arguing that, among the affections in question, Sextus in-
cludes certain emotions. However, the examples he gives of unavoidable affections
are always of a perceptual and physical kind: the feelings of cold and heat, thirst
and hunger (PH 1.13, 24, 29, 238; AD 5.143, 149, 152), pain and pleasure (AD 5.143,
150, 159)—where these seem to be understood exclusively in a physical way—and
the fact of having a fever (AD 5.156); he also speaks more generally of the way one
is affected perceptually (PH 3.236; AD 5.148). I nonetheless think that, when Sextus
speaks of the Pyrrhonist acting without opinions in accordance with the laws and
customs of his community (PH 1.17, 23‒24, 231, 237; AD 3.49, 5.166), there is an emo-
tional component in the non-doxastic appearances he has by virtue of those social
norms. Note that Sextus points out that the Pyrrhonist, proceeding in accordance
with traditional laws and customs, accepts that piety is good and impiety bad (PH
1.24), and that he will choose one course of action and avoid the other if compelled
by a tyrant to do some unspeakable deed (AD 5.166). It seems clear to me that this
implies that impious actions induce a negative emotion and corresponding reaction
in a Pyrrhonist who belongs to a given socio-cultural context. Similarly, if that Pyr-
rhonist witnessed what moral realists regard as an unspeakable or forbidden deed,
he might automatically experience a negative emotion that would trigger a gut reac-
tion: for instance, if faced with an act of rape, murder, or torture, he might experi-
ence a visceral response of repulsion and might do something to counter that act,
even though he suspends judgment about whether such an act is objectively bad
or to be avoided. If my interpretation is on the right track, then even after suspending
judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad, the Pyrrhonist still ex-
periences positive or negative emotions when confronted with certain situations.³⁵
Now, having moral emotions may be sufficient for us to be moral creatures. In this
regard, note that, based on a number of studies in psychology, some moral psychol-
ogists have called into question the rationalist view that moral judgment is caused by
a process of conscious reasoning or reflection, claiming instead that it is primarily
and directly caused by moral intuitions and emotions. For example, according to
the social intuitionist model defended by Jonathan Haidt, moral judgment is in gen-
eral the result of intuitions—i.e., quick, automatic, effortless, and affectively laden
evaluations—and moral action co-varies more with moral emotion than with moral
reasoning. In his view, moral reasoning is usually nothing but an ex post facto proc-
ess in which one seeks arguments that will justify an already-made judgment with
the aim of influencing the intuitions and actions of others.³⁶
 For more on this issue, see McPherran, “Ataraxia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 144,
154‒56; Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 131‒32; Machuca, “Argumentative
Persuasiveness,” 123; Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.
 See Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (October 2001): 814‒34; Thalia Wheatley and Jon-
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My second remark regarding Nussbaum’s claim that the Pyrrhonist removes
something that is fundamental in the nature of most human beings is that this
would be a problem only provided that the thing removed is unquestionably good.
Given that it is clear that Nussbaum thinks that the item removed is morally good,
I should repeat here my remark that Nussbaum assumes what she should prove
when arguing against the Pyrrhonist: removing something that is deemed to be
good by the moral realist is not a problem for the Pyrrhonist inasmuch as he sus-
pends judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad. But setting
the question of moral goodness aside, a present-day Pyrrhonist could point out
that not everyone agrees on the instrumental goodness or usefulness of morality,
as is shown, for instance, by the contemporary metaethical disagreement on this
issue. Moral error theorists maintain either that all positive moral judgments are
false because there are no objective moral properties,³⁷ or that they are all neither
true nor false because the moral facts they presuppose do not exist.³⁸ However,
among them there is a disagreement between moral fictionalists and moral abolition-
ists. The former claim that morality produces practical benefits (for example, person-
al happiness or political stability), and so that we should continue to make moral
utterances and have moral thoughts,while at the same time refraining from asserting
such utterances and believing such thoughts. That is, even though moral realism is
false, we should maintain the fiction that it is true.³⁹ One could argue that moral fic-
tionalists think that morality is instrumentally good in that it is an effective means to
attain certain goals we seek. Moral abolitionists, by contrast, contend that morality
causes more suffering than it prevents, and that it is therefore desirable and useful to
abandon moral language and thinking altogether.⁴⁰
Fifthly, and in connection with my previous remarks on the Pyrrhonist’s emo-
tions, the claim that his suspension prevents him from properly caring about others
overlooks the fact that whether one cares about someone or something seems to de-
pend to a considerable extent on one’s emotions rather than on one’s beliefs. A
mother who instinctively reacts to save her child from danger does not say to herself
that she takes it to be true that she is morally obliged to save her child or that her
child is worth saving; in fact, she may not have formed those beliefs at all and
might never form them.You likely care about the well-being of your parents, your sib-
lings, your children, your friends, or your spouse without having acquired the belief
that you have the moral obligation to care about them or the belief that they are
worth your care. Moreover, even though in some cases one concludes that one should
athan Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,” Psychological Science 16,
no. 10 (October 2005): 780‒84.
 See John Leslie Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
 See Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 See Joyce, The Myth of Morality.
 See Richard Garner, “Abolishing Morality,” in A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s
Moral Error Theory, eds. Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 217‒33.
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not be concerned about what might befall them, one will very likely be concerned all
the same. Hence, the holding of beliefs does not seem to be a conditio sine qua non
for loving your child, being concerned about your dog’s well-being, or caring about
the result of a soccer match. As I argued above, it seems clear that the Pyrrhonist’s
suspension does not do away with such emotions. Hence, I think that Julia Annas is
mistaken when she claims that the Pyrrhonist cannot be concerned about others’
physical and emotional problems,⁴¹ i.e., their “mundane problems like toothache,
poverty or unrequited love,” because “these could only bother him if he believed
that these were bad things, which of course he does not.”⁴² In her view, the Pyrrhon-
ist can only be bothered by others’ intellectual problems, i.e., by their holding of be-
liefs, because that is what he seeks to cure by means of his argumentative therapy,
which is motivated by a philanthropic attitude (PH 3.280‒81). If so, he could not be
concerned about the well-being of another full-blown Pyrrhonist. According to the
deflationary interpretation⁴³ to which I referred in my second set of remarks, neither
philanthropy nor the therapeutic use of arguments should be viewed as defining fea-
tures of Pyrrhonism: whether the Pyrrhonist is philanthropic or seeks to cure others
of their dogmatism by means of argument will depend on circumstantial factors. But
then one can likewise argue that nothing rules out the possibility that a Pyrrhonist
may be emotionally troubled by the unavoidable problems of others. A Pyrrhonist
who happens to be philanthropic may seek, by inducing suspension, to remove
the disturbance apparently caused in the dogmatists by their holding of beliefs,
but he may also seek to mitigate their unavoidable physical and emotional distur-
bances because he may be emotionally distressed by the unavoidable suffering of
anyone—whether a dogmatist, a newly converted Pyrrhonist, or a veteran Pyrrhonist.
Again, such distress will not be the result of the holding of beliefs, but part of the
emotions that impose themselves on the Pyrrhonist to the extent that he is affected
by those psychological and social factors that happen to influence him. Someone
will no doubt complain, once more, that this does not make the Pyrrhonist very re-
liable given that his concern about others’ problems of one kind or another will al-
ways be fortuitous or contingent. But I am not sure that this is different from the case
of those who claim to care about others due to their beliefs or even reflective beliefs.
For their holding the beliefs they hold seems to be dependent to a considerable ex-
tent on circumstantial factors. In addition, we see on a daily basis how many who
claim to be moral realists or religious believers and to reject inequality and unfair
suffering are entirely indifferent to those in need. Therefore, we should conclude ei-
 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 246‒48, 353.
 Annas, 246.
 The reason I call my interpretation of certain aspects of Sextus’s account of Pyrrhonism “defla-
tionary” is simply that I do not take such aspects to be essential to this form of scepticism. My inter-
pretation of the practical and epistemic value of Pyrrhonism is also deflationary inasmuch as, in my
view, the Pyrrhonist does not think that his stance has either kind of value in an objective sense.
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ther that they are being disingenuous in expressing their normative commitments, or
that belief does not ensure genuine concern for others.
Finally, I think it is important to make the probably obvious remark that, even if
we grant that Pyrrhonism has no prudential or moral value, we should guard against
mistaking pragmatic reasons for rejecting Pyrrhonism (or other forms of scepticism)
for epistemic reasons. The fact that Pyrrhonism represents a hindrance to the attain-
ment of certain goals one takes to be crucial to one’s personal or social life does not
prove that Pyrrhonism is incoherent or false. To do so, one has to examine whether
there are epistemic reasons for rejecting Pyrrhonism, and if one cannot find any, then
one should be prepared to accept the pragmatic consequences of our inability to re-
fute it, even if they are appalling. At least those who are in the business of philoso-
phy should swallow their fear and follow where the arguments lead.
I should emphasise that my aim has not been to defend the Pyrrhonist from the
charge of immorality in the sense of showing that he necessarily conducts himself in
a moral way, for whether he behaves morally or immorally from the point of view of
non-Pyrrhonists depends on a number of fortuitous factors. Nor have I attempted to
show that Pyrrhonism is a desirable or attractive philosophy inasmuch as it would
contribute to our well-being, for whether one finds it so will depend, to a consider-
able extent, on contingent psychological factors. My aim has instead been to dispel
certain serious misunderstandings regarding the Pyrrhonian stance.⁴⁴
4 The Epistemic Value of Suspension
What about the epistemic value of the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment? What is
its value concerning the goals of attaining truth and avoiding error? The answer
seems to depend in part on whose vantage point one adopts and in part on how
one interprets the connection between equipollence and suspension.
Let me address the second point first. As we saw in Section 2, such a connection
can be interpreted either as a requirement of rationality or as a merely psychological
constraint. If the Pyrrhonist’s reason for withholding assent whenever confronted
with conflicting views on p that strike him as equipollent were a commitment on
his part to investigating truth by applying the requirements of rationality, then the
 For other replies to the charge that Pyrrhonism lacks practical value that somewhat complement
the arguments advanced in the present section, see John Christian Laursen, “Yes, Skeptics Can Live
Their Skepticism and Cope with Tyranny as Well as Anyone,” in Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-
Renaissance Thought, eds. José Maia Neto and Richard Popkin (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004),
201‒23; Laursen, “The Moral Life of the Ancient Skeptics: Living in Accordance with Nature and Free-
dom from Disturbance,” Bolletino della Società Filosofica Italiana 219 (2016): 5‒22; and Emidio Spine-
lli, “Neither Philosophy nor Politics? The Ancient Pyrrhonian Approach to Everyday Life,” in Skepti-
cism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, eds. John Christian Laursen
and Gianni Paganini (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2015), 17‒35.
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epistemic value of his suspension would be clear. For, first, by refraining from adopt-
ing a view on p in favour of which he does not have compelling evidence, the Pyr-
rhonist seeks to avoid error. Second, by remaining engaged in rationally driven inqui-
ry, he keeps searching for further evidence that could tip the balance in favour of one
of the rival views on p, which would bring him closer to the truth. If, by contrast, the
psychological interpretation of the connection between equipollence and suspension
were correct, it could be argued that Pyrrhonism does not have much to offer in
terms of epistemic value. For although the Pyrrhonist is a thinking being who is hard-
wired to suspend judgment when confronted with arguments pro and con p that
strike him as equipollent, he refrains from making assertions about whether those
arguments are sound, whether they are equipollent, and whether suspension is
the correct rational response in the face of equipollent disagreement. The Pyrrhonist
does suspend judgment, he does refrain from affirming that investigation of truth is
doomed to failure, and he does keep on inquiring into the various subjects about
which people hold beliefs. But although his suspension might make it possible to
avoid error, he does not affirm that this is indeed the case and that the avoidance
of error is therefore one of his reasons for suspending judgment. And although his
ongoing inquiry might make it possible to find the truth, he makes no assertions
about whether his inquiry is the correct means to search for truth. In line with my
deflationary interpretation of Pyrrhonism, I think that the Pyrrhonist’s continuing
engagement in philosophical inquiry is to be explained by the influence of psycho-
logical and social factors, and that his suspension only entails that he cannot affirm
or deny that truth can be found.
I think, however, that it is a mistake to claim that Pyrrhonism is of no epistemic
value if the psychological interpretation is correct, a mistake that brings me to the
first point mentioned above. For even if the Pyrrhonist himself refrains from affirm-
ing (or denying) the epistemic value of his suspension, this does not mean that the
suspension he exercises lacks epistemic value from the vantage point of those non-
Pyrrhonists who are committed to the requirement of rationality according to which
one should suspend judgment when confronted with a dispute one is unable to set-
tle. From that vantage point, it could also be argued that the epistemic value of Pyr-
rhonian suspension consists in that it encourages or promotes the intellectual virtues
of caution and humility, in two respects. First, the Pyrrhonist’s suspension is a rec-
ognition of his inability to give his assent to any one of the parties to a given dispute,
i.e., a recognition that he has so far been unable to settle the disagreements he has
examined. He describes as arrogance, rashness, and self-satisfaction the attitudes of
his rivals⁴⁵ inasmuch as they hold fast to their views on p without taking careful ac-
count of rival views on p or even despite acknowledging the existence of widespread
and entrenched disagreement over p. One could take the Pyrrhonian attitude to be a
good antidote to jumping to conclusions and performing hasty actions. He lacks his
 See, for example, PH 1.20, 90, 177, 3.235, 280‒81.
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rivals’ overconfidence in the correctness of their own opinions and the reliability of
their cognitive powers. In this regard, it is perhaps worth mentioning some recent
studies in psychology that show that unskilled people tend to suffer from “illusory
superiority,” rating their cognitive abilities as above average, whereas skilled people
tend to suffer from “illusory inferiority,” underestimating or underrating their cogni-
tive abilities.⁴⁶ One could argue that Pyrrhonian suspension would protect us from
this kind of epistemic bias, faced as we are with the difficulty of determining from
which sort of illusion we might be suffering. Second, Pyrrhonian investigation is
characterised by open-mindedness inasmuch as the Pyrrhonist does not affirm (or
deny) that the disagreements he has so far inspected are unresolvable in themselves,
but carries on his philosophical inquiry into the disputed matters. In other words, the
Pyrrhonist’s past failure to discover the truth in those matters (if there is any) does
not lead him to claim that the search for truth is doomed to failure. For he cannot
rule out the possibility that, through further investigation, he might discover new evi-
dence and arguments bearing on the disputed matters that will make it possible to
adjudicate the disagreements.
Some people—probably most—might nonetheless regard the Pyrrhonist’s across-
the-board suspension as lacking any real epistemic value in that it pushes intellec-
tual caution and humility to the extreme. They would argue that the Pyrrhonist ac-
tually manifests the vices of intellectual cowardice and of undue timidity in one’s
intellectual life. For although there are cases in which suspension is indeed ration-
ally required by the equal force of the evidence and arguments in favour of each of
the conflicting views, in most cases we do have strong epistemic reasons for prefer-
ring one of the views to the other(s). For this reason, they would also argue that the
Pyrrhonist is intellectually dishonest when he claims that, in all the disagreements
he has considered, the rival views strike him as equipollent. In response, it should
be remarked that, aside from the fact that the objectors’ own experience is different
from the Pyrrhonist’s, there seems to be no reason for suspecting that the latter is not
sincere or truthful when reporting on what has happened to him up to this point. For
it may indeed be the case that the Pyrrhonist has found himself in the state of being
at a loss how to resolve all those disagreements he has examined up to this point.
Hence, I do not think that the objectors can easily maintain that the Pyrrhonist is dis-
ingenuous, although they could perhaps still hold that, from their own non-sceptical
point of view, he is intellectually cowardly and unduly timid in his philosophical in-
vestigations.
 See, for example, Justin Kruger and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficul-
ties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 77, no. 6 (December 1999): 1121‒34; Joyce Ehrlinger, Kerri Johnson, Matthew
Banner, David Dunning, and Justin Kruger, “Why the Unskilled Are Unaware: Further Explorations of
(Absent) Self-Insight among the Incompetent,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process-
es 105, no. 1 (January 2008): 98‒121.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Does the Pyrrhonist promise us that, if we suspend judgment across the board, we
will become undisturbed regarding matters of opinion? No, he does not because
he cannot. Does he promise us that, if we attain such a mental state, we will find
it enjoyable and will even achieve a considerable degree of happiness or well-
being? No, he does not because he cannot. Does he promise us that the person
who suspends judgment across the board will act morally? No, he does not because
he cannot. Does he affirm that suspension has epistemic value in that it allows us to
attain truth and avoid error? No, he does not because he cannot. Does this all mean
that suspension and undisturbedness have no practical or epistemic value for us and
that reading Sextus is of no philosophical interest to us? I have already partially ad-
dressed this last question at the end of the previous section, but I would like to ex-
amine it further to conclude.
Someone might indeed argue that, if the Pyrrhonist has no doxastic commitment
to the practical and the epistemic value of suspension and undisturbedness but only
reports on the way things have appeared to him up to this point, then his whole en-
terprise will look pointless and he will hardly win new supporters.⁴⁷ Moreover, one
might wonder whether Sextus’s writings are of any philosophical interest insofar
as throughout them he is merely offering a personal testimony on what has so far
happened to him (e.g., PH 1.4, 187‒209). In reply, let me make two sets of remarks.
To begin with, even though the absence of assertions may lead many to reject
Sextus’s writings out of hand, nothing necessarily precludes one from finding
them philosophically challenging and intriguing. For it is one thing how Sextus in-
tends what he writes to be interpreted, and quite another how his readers react to his
writings or what use they can make of his writings. For example, someone may be-
lieve that some of Sextus’s arguments are sound and have significant philosophical
implications. Also, even if one rejects his stance as too radical, one may still find it
philosophically stimulating in that it challenges one to ponder more carefully prob-
lems concerning knowledge, justification, inquiry, disagreement, and action.⁴⁸ This
in fact explains why quite a number of contemporary epistemologists have engaged
with the justificatory challenges posed by the Modes of Agrippa. To better illustrate
my point, let me refer to Henri Estienne’s experience with Pyrrhonism as described in
the preface to his Latin rendering of PH published in 1562.⁴⁹ In an autobiographical
story of the genesis of the translation, he tells us that while afflicted by a quartan
 Cf. Nussbaum “Skeptic Purgatives,” 303; Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 189; and McPherran, “Atarax-
ia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 139–40.
 See Machuca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” 210n14.
 I have used the complete French translation of the preface provided by Emmanuel Naya in “Tra-
duire les Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes: Henri Estienne entre la fièvre quarte et la folie chrétienne,” in
Le scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe, ed. Pierre-François Moreau (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 48‒101.
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fever that was caused by an immoderate study of letters and that made him hate the
very sight of books, he stumbled upon an incomplete and hasty translation of the
main principles of the Pyrrhonian sect that he had made some time before. Its
first reading immediately made him laugh—subsequent readings having the same ef-
fect—which in turn allowed him to overcome his exhaustion and reconciled him with
the letters. By ridiculing the doctrines of the dogmatic authors the reading of whose
works required so much intellectual effort, Sextus’s work had a therapeutic effect on
Estienne, who therefore found Pyrrhonism of practical value. But, in Estienne’s view,
it may also be of both practical and epistemic value to the dogmatists themselves in-
asmuch as it can render them humble by attacking the impudence and rashness of
their assertions, and by allowing them to recognise their cognitive limitations and to
accept that the only truth is that of Revelation. By adopting such a fideistic stance,
Estienne took Pyrrhonism to be a remedy not only for the aversion to the study of
letters people may experience after reading the dogmatists’ works, but also for the
disease of impiety that affects the latter. Given such a twofold therapeutic effica-
ciousness, Estienne decided to make PH available to those with no knowledge of
Greek. Even though he recognises such a curative effect, he cautions us against abus-
ing the sceptical critical attitude by calling into question not only the erroneous
things said by the dogmatists but also those that are valuable, and despite observing
at the outset that he has metamorphosed into a sceptic, he later remarks that he is
not himself one and does not intend others to become sceptics. Although Estienne
makes clear the fictive character of his autobiographical story, the benefits he
found in a certain application of Pyrrhonism are to be taken seriously. Sextus
would of course reject a fideistic use of Pyrrhonism on the grounds that those
who made such a use would be doxastically committed to certain metaphysical
and religious views. But the issue under consideration is whether Pyrrhonism
could be of practical or epistemic value to someone who is not a Pyrrhonist, and
hence who eschews some of his beliefs while retaining others. In general, the fideis-
tic use made of Pyrrhonism in Renaissance and modern philosophy is a clear exam-
ple of the practical and epistemic value it may have for non-sceptics.
Secondly, it might well occur that some will identify with Sextus’s account of his
own experience or will be deeply influenced by it. For it does not seem possible to
establish a priori that Pyrrhonism is utterly unappealing as a philosophy.⁵⁰ Whether
that is the case depends on whether one values such attitudes as caution, open-
mindedness, questioning, and intellectual modesty; and, if one does, on whether
one thinks those attitudes should be adopted across the board and on whether
one thinks they are to be preferred to the sense of comfort or reassurance one
may experience when confidently espousing, say, moral or religious beliefs. For in-
stance, I know a scholar for whom the reading of Sextus’s writings prompts the ex-
perience of “being blissful,” in much the same way as does the reading of certain
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 138.
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Buddhist texts. Also, if you may forgive my being self-referential, I should point out
that I have been reading Sextus and been interested in Pyrrhonism as a philosophy
for almost twenty years. Despite the deflationary interpretation of the epistemic and
practical value of Pyrrhonism that I have defended in this essay, I still find that form
of scepticism captivating and thought-provoking. This is due to the fact that I identify
both with the Pyrrhonist’s experience of being at a loss how to resolve the en-
trenched and longstanding disagreements we encounter in philosophy, morality, pol-
itics, religion, and economics, and with his experience of finding oneself, whenever
one carries the application of the logical and epistemological principles dictated by
reason to the limit, in a situation of aporia in which such principles end up under-
mining themselves.
You may still think that Sextus is not offering much, and you are of course free to
think so. But just keep in mind that others may disagree: the brand of Pyrrhonism
presented in his writings played an important part in the philosophical scene of
the Imperial age, had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy
thanks to the rediscovery of those writings, and continues to be a topic of lively dis-
cussion among both ancient philosophy scholars and analytic epistemologists.
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